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Nontechnical Summary
Starting in 2005, the EU will introduce an EU-wide carbon emissions trading system to promote cost-
efficiency of aggregate EU emission abatement (EU 2003). By implementing the EU Directive, the first
multi-national trading scheme will become operative. It covers energy-intensive installations in five
downstream sectors that account for the larger part of the overall EU carbon emissions: power, heat and
steam generation, oil refineries, coke ovens in iron and steel production, mineral industries (e.g. glass,
cement) as well as pulp and paper plants. Member States must allocate 95 % of emission allowances for
free until 2008 and can auction at most 10 per cent of the allowances in the second period 2008-2012
(Article 10, EU 2003).
In this paper we show that it is generally impossible to retain overall economic efficiency when
requiring free allocation of allowances and non-discrimination of firms across countries. In general, the
assignment of allowances is endogenous and differs widely across countries, thereby substantiating
concerns for implicit state aid and competitive distortions. Thus, the stated objectives of the European
Directive – efficiency, harmonization (“rule neutrality” and “competition neutrality”), and free allocation
of allowances – are incompatible.
An efficient way out of the current regulation dilemma posed by the multiple objectives of the EU
Directive could be to relax the requirement of free allocation. Then, the minimal fraction of allowances
which must be allocated is given by the minimum of assignment factors across EU Member States. As a
mean to heading towards a more harmonized allocation of allowances, a continuous increase of the
auctioned ratio of tradable allowances may prove a realistic policy option.
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Abstract. Starting in 2005, the EU will implement a CO2 emissions trading scheme. In this paper we
show that the outspoken goals of economic efficiency and free allocation of allowances are incompatible
with harmonized allocation rules. In general, the assignment of allowances is endogenous and differs
widely across countries, thereby substantiating concerns for implicit state aid and competitive distortions.
We discuss potential adjustments to the Directive in order to allow for harmonization, i.e. for identical
assignment factors to similar firms located in different EU countries.
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11.  Introduction
Starting in 2005, the EU will introduce an EU-wide carbon emissions trading system to
promote cost-efficiency of aggregate EU emission abatement (EU 2003). By implementing
the EU Directive, the first multi-national trading scheme will become operative. The
envisaged trading scheme represents part of the EU efforts to cut its greenhouse gas
emissions by 8 % by 2008-2012 (as committed to under the Kyoto Protocol) and 70 % in the
longer term (as stated in the preamble of the Directive) compared to 1990 emission levels.1 It
covers energy-intensive installations in five downstream sectors that account for the larger
part of the overall EU carbon emissions: power, heat and steam generation, oil refineries,
coke ovens in iron and steel production, mineral industries (e.g. glass, cement) as well as pulp
and paper plants. Member States must allocate 95 % of emission allowances for free until
2008 and can auction at most 10 per cent of the allowances in the second period 2008-2012
(Article 10, EU 2003).
We show that these provisions of the Directive, namely efficiency and the free allocation
of allowances, are in conflict with the goal of harmonized allowance allocation rules. Each
Member State is required by the EU Directive to lay down these rules in National Allocation
Plans. Within the National Allocation Plans, each Member State (i) fixes the quantity of
allowances it intends to allocate to installations covered by the Directive (allocation budget),
and (ii) states rules to assign these allowances to the respective installations (allocation
mechanism). Complementary abatement policies must be pursued in the sectors not covered
by the Directive to balance the countries’ emissions budgets which are given by the EU
burden sharing agreement (EU 1999). The National Allocation Plans will be scrutinized by
the Commission with respect to “common criteria” such as competitive distortions (Annex
III, EU 2003). However, as there is no explicit harmonization of allocation plans across
countries, concerns persist that differences in the assignment of free emission allowances to
firms could distort competition.
                                                          
1 Note that the EU Directive will become effective independent of the enactment of the Kyoto Protocol
which still requires the (rather uncertain) ratification by Russia.
2Whereas such distortions from a more narrow economic perspective, i.e. in terms of
overall efficiency losses, can be prevented by relying on lump-sum allocation mechanisms,2
Woerdman (2001, 2003) identifies different implicit financial (lump-sum) transfers to similar
firms and the resulting distortion of the `level playing field' as a competitive distortion from
the legal point of view.
Utilizing this definition, we illustrate by means of a simple partial analytical model that
distortions are inherent to the setup of the European emissions trading system as envisaged
under the EU Directive. Different from one-jurisdictional trading schemes like the U.S. SO2
market, reaching efficiency with free allowances implies that identical firms operating in
different countries will generally receive different emission assignments. That is, the
assignment factor - for example in an emissions-based (grandfathering) allocation scheme - is
endogenous in each country. Due to this endogeneity, any harmonization of assignment
factors to preserve “competition neutrality” has to go along with country-specific adjustments
in the allocation rules. Concretely, we illustrate that uniform assignment factors can be
reached without affecting economic efficiency through changes in the prescription of free
allocation. As an alternative, country-specific allocation budgets could be adjusted. However,
such an adjustment will typically induce inefficient emission levels in at least some sectors.
2.  The Endogeneity Problem 
We use a simple partial two-sector, multi-region model to illustrate the problem of
endogeneity and competitive distortions within the multi-jurisdictional setting of the EU
Directive. Each region r can allocate an overall exogenous emission budget rE 3 to either
installations in the sectors covered by the Directive or to the remaining sectors of the region.4
Whereas the former are eligible for international emissions trading (TRD), the latter will not
                                                          
2 The allowance allocation may not be affected by (upcoming) firms’ decisions - see Böhringer and
Lange (2003a, b) for a recent discussion of dynamic allocation rules and the implicit trade-off between
economic efficiency and compensation.
3 In the EU case, the aggregate emission targets are given by the EU burden sharing agreement which
distributes the EU-wide Kyoto emission target across  individual Member States (EU 1999).
4 Note that sector is used as a more general term of a certain grouping of installations or firms that
have similar characteristics and access to similar technologies.
3be trading at the international level (NTR), i.e. these sectors are subject to complementary
domestic regulation (such as e.g. a domestic carbon tax).
Sectors are represented by aggregate abatement cost functions , ,( )r s r sC e  (decreasing,
convex, differentiable) where s   {TRD, NTR}.5 The historic emission levels prior to the
establishment of the (partial) emissions trading system are denoted by 0,r se  yielding aggregate
emission levels 0 0 0, , r r TRD r NTRE e e .
Reflecting the requirements of National Allocation Plans, each regional government
must decide on (i) the allocation budget, i.e. the number of allowances TRDre ,  it allocates to
the sectors covered by the Directive, and (ii) the allocation mechanism, i.e. a specific
allocation metric, ( )rg ,
6 of free allowances to sectors eligible for international emissions
trading; the allocation mechanism maps firm-specific data like (historic) emissions into
emissions-assignments. At the national level, the choice of the allocation budget TRDre ,  must
be consistent with the overall exogenous emission budget rE , i.e. , , rr TRD r NTRe E e ,
where NTRre ,  denotes the implicit upper bound on emissions for the non-trading sectors
outside the EU Directive.
It is obvious that balancing a given choice for TRDre ,  and the allocation metric ( )rg
requires some endogenous assignment factor: , ( ) r TRD r re g . Therefore, even if countries
use the same allocation metric ( ) ( )  rg g , there is an obvious “trade-off” between the
choice of the allocation budget and the implementation of identical assignment factors.
To illustrate this point in more detail, we consider allocations based on grandfathering.
Here, the metric )(rg  is given by historic emissions 
0
,TRDre . Provided that all allowances are
allocated for free, the assignment factor under such a lump-sum emissions-based allocation
                                                          
5 Note that with such a representation of abatement costs, we implicitly assume that the emission target
is distributed efficiently across installations inside TRD and inside NTR ,respectively.
6 )(rg captures the functional relationships for the allocation metric, that could include updated or
historic emission levels, emission intensities, etc.
4rule is endogenously given by 0
,
,
0
,
,
TRDr
NTRrr
TRDr
TRDr
r e
eE
e
e 
 .7 Obviously, we obtain the
following (region-specific) determinants for the assignment factor:
 The larger the overall emission target rE , the larger the assignment factor will be.
 The larger the emission budget for the NTR sectors, the smaller the allocation budget
for the TRD sectors and, hence, the smaller the assignment factor will be.
 The smaller the historic level 0,TRDre  of emissions in trading sectors, the larger the
assignment factor will be.8
Following the `level playing field' argument by Woerdman (2002), allocation schemes
should not discriminate between firms having the same characteristics but operating in
different countries. In other words: The assignment factors should not differ across regions,
i.e. 'rr   for all 
', rr . Unless regions were to be fully symmetric, this poses a trade-off
between “rule neutrality” and “competition neutrality” since the adaptation of the same rules
for determining the allocation budget and the allocation metric generally imposes different
assignment factors for identical firms in different regions.
3.  Cost-efficient Design of National Allocation Plans
According to the EU Directive, Member States – in setting up the National Allocation Plans –
first have to decide on the allocation budget, i.e. the aggregate number of (free) allowances
they set aside for the trading sectors. The simplest proposal (see e.g. DIW et al. 2003)
involves a uniform reduction in percental emissions across trading and non-trading sectors
based on historic emission levels. In this case, the assignment factor to trading sectors in
                                                          
7 For an analysis of distortionary output- and emission-based allocation in a dynamic setting see
Böhringer and Lange (2003a,b) and Fischer (2001). In the German debate on the National allocation
plan, some more sophisticated non-uniform emission-based allocation schemes have been proposed
which account for sector-specific characteristics and early action. By requiring more sector-specific
information, however, differentiated rates lead to more possibilities for lobbying by sector-specific
interest groups (Stavins 1998, p.79). The resulting sector-specific assignment factors cannot prevent
the described endogeneity problem.
8 In particular, this implies that firms in regions that had faced a stricter historic regulation (or early
action etc. ) will be partly compensated by higher transfers compared to other regions.
5region r would be given by 0
r
r
r E
E
  where 0rE denotes a historic aggregate emission level
for region r. Apart from conflicting with the `level-playing-field' objective, such a proposal
induces potentially large efficiency losses since marginal abatement costs between the trading
and non-trading sectors will generally fall apart. A cost-efficient design of National
Allocation Plans across the European Union (as explicitly pursued under Article 1 of the EU
Directive) implies that aggregate abatement costs  sr sreC, , )(  should be minimized subject
to the aggregate emission target   r rsr sr Ee, , which leads to )(
*
,
'
,
*
srsr eC for all s
  {TRD, NTR} and r, i.e. equalized marginal abatement costs across all regions and sectors.
If we assume the implementation of the cost-efficient emission level *,NTRre  in the non-
trading sectors9, the regulator in region r can issue at most *,NTRrr eE   allowances to the
trading sectors. As the uniform emissions-based allocation of TRDre ,  is lump-sum, efficiency
can be reached and the country-specific assignment factors are endogenously determined
by 0
,
*
,
TRDr
NTRrr
r e
eE 
 . The concrete assignment factor depends on various region-specific
characteristics such as the effective emission reduction requirement ( rE ), the relative ease of
carbon reduction in the trading sectors vis-à-vis the non-trading sectors (determining *,r NTRe )
as well as historic emissions 0,r TRDe .
Table 1 reports the implied differences of assignment factors across EU member
countries according to simulations with an established multi-region, multi-sector computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model (see e.g. Böhringer 2002a,b or Böhringer and Vogt 2003).
                                                          
9 Cost-minimizing firms that are covered by the Directive will reach optimal emission levels
*
,TRDre through international emissions trading if the total number of allowances is given by
**
, TRDr TRDr
Ee  . Regarding the overall cost-efficient regulation of sectors that are not covered by
the Directive, each region would have to set a carbon tax equal to the emission price * ; alternatively,
the region could establish a domestic permit market and auction off **, NTRr NTRr Ee   to sectors s 
{NTR}.
6The model is based on most recent consistent accounts of EU Member States’ production and
consumption, bilateral trade and energy flows for 1997 (as provided by the GTAP5-E
database – see McDougall et al. 1999). A detailed model description is provided in Appendix
A which is available from ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/nap_cge.pdf.
The column labeled “CO2 emissions – 1990” provides the baseline emissions for 1990
which is the reference year for the emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol. The Member States’ reduction targets under the EU burden sharing agreement are
reported in the column labeled “Kyoto targets”. The third column “CO2 emission budget rE ”
gives the resulting overall cap rE . The CO2 emissions for the (model’s) base-year 1997 are
summarized in column “CO2 emissions – 1997”. These emissions combined with the overall
Kyoto budget rE  yield the effective reduction targets with respect to 1997 base-year
emission levels (column “Effective targets”). Column “CO2 emissions by trading sectors –
1997” indicates the base-year emissions of those sectors (installations) that are covered by the
EU Directive: power, heat and steam generation, oil refineries, coke ovens in iron and steel
production, mineral industries (e.g. glass, cement) as well as pulp and paper plants. Next, the
column labeled “Cost-efficient CO2 emissions *,r NTRe ” states the (optimal) least-cost
10
emissions in the non-trading sectors emerging from the CGE calculations where we apply the
effective reduction targets to the 1997 base-year EU economy. The assignment factors
(column “Assignment factors”) are then derived via 0
,
*
,
TRDr
NTRrr
r e
eE 
  where 0,r TRDe
represents the 1997 base-year emissions of the trading sectors. The differences across EU
Member States are substantial ranging from 0.34 in Denmark up to 1.24 for The Netherlands.
Given identical historic emissions levels, a firm in The Netherlands would thus be assigned
nearly four times the number of allowances given to the Danish firm.
                                                          
10 That is, marginal abatement costs are equalized across all regions and sectors.
7Table 1: Assignment factors under the EU Directive for emissions-based allocation of free allowances (based on 1997 data)
1990 CO2
emissions
Kyoto targets CO2 emission
budget rE
1997 CO2
emissions
Effective targets 1997 CO2 emissions by
trading sectors 0,r TRDe
Cost-efficient CO2
emissionsa *,r NTRe
Assignment
factor r
b
Minimum
assignment factor
 min r rλ =min λ
Auction
[Mt] [% vis-à-vis 1990] [Mt] [Mt] [% vis-à-vis 1997] [Mt] [Mt] [ % of ( rE - *,r NTRe )]
Austria 50 13.0 43 54 19.6 17 36 0.41 0.34 17
Belgium 118 7.5 109 132 17.5 33 95 0.42 0.34 19
Germany 975 21.0 770 858 10.3 355 484 0.80 0.34 58
Denmark 55 21.0 44 68 35.8 35 32 0.34 0.34 0
Spain 214 -15.0 247 259 4.8 83 27 0.81 0.34 58
Finland 52 0.0 52 59 10.9 31 313 1.13 0.34 70
France 378 0.0 378 384 1.6 57 328 0.90 0.34 62
United Kingdom 558 12.5 488 522 6.5 177 46 1.21 0.34 72
Greece 71 -25.0 89 84 -6.5 35 17 0.88 0.34 61
Ireland 26 -13.0 29 32 8.3 14 257 0.81 0.34 58
Italy 394 6.5 369 405 8.9 138 6 0.96 0.34 64
Luxembourg 9 28.0 7 7 9.5 1 153 0.57 0.34 40
Netherlands 200 6.0 188 222 15.1 62 35 1.24 0.34 73
Portugal 45 -27.0 57 54 -5.2 18 169 0.94 0.34 64
Sweden 53 -4.0 55 56 1.6 10 45 1.00 0.34 66
EU-15 3198 8.6 2925 3196 8.5 1066 2043 0.83 0.34 59
a based on CGE calculations
b calculated as  * 0, ,/rr r NTR r TRDE e e  
8Obviously, such an uneven treatment justifies major concerns regarding “competition
neutrality” and stronger claims for a (at least partial) harmonization of assignment factors.
4.  Ensuring „Competition Neutrality“
In our discussion of the endogeneity problem, we assumed “rule neutrality” in the sense that
each government (i) implements the optimal (least-cost) emission level in sectors not covered
by the Directive and (ii) allocates all of its remaining emission allowances for free to the
Directive sectors eligible for international emissions trading. Obviously, a uniform
assignment factor  could be implemented by shifting the abatement burdens between non-
trading sectors and trading sectors, i.e. by choosing 0, ,rr NTR r TRDe E e  . This, however,
implies potentially large efficiency losses because marginal abatement costs would no longer
be equalized between trading and non-trading sectors.
Another possibility which retains efficiency is to change the number of freely allocated
allowances. For example, one could adopt the minimal (endogenous) assignment factor
 min min r r 
 as the allocation rule for country, and then let each country auction off its remaining
allowances 0, min , rr NTR r TRDe E e  within the European trading scheme. While maintaining
efficiency, this harmonization procedure towards “competition neutrality” requires a fraction
of min1 / r   of allowances to be auctioned off.
The final column of Table 1 reports the necessary fraction of auctioning in EU Member
States if the harmonized assignment factor were based on the minimal Danish factor (0.34).
The auctioned fraction is largest for the U.K., the Netherlands, and Finland with more than 70
%. In our concrete numerical example, all auctioning rates (except for the minimum Danish
one) conflict with the prescriptions of the current EU Directive in which only a maximum of
5 % (10 % ) may be auctioned off.11
                                                          
11  According to Article 12, Member States must allocate 95% of emission allowances for free until
2007 and can auction at most 10 percent of the allowances in the period 2008-2012 (Article 10, EU
2003).
95.  Conclusions
We have shown that it is generally impossible to retain efficiency when requiring free
allocation of allowances and non-discrimination of firms across countries. Thus, the stated
objectives of the European Directive – efficiency, harmonization (“rule neutrality” and
“competition neutrality”), and free allocation of allowances – are incompatible. Along the
policy-relevant example of lump-sum grandfathering, we illustrated the huge differences in
(endogenous) assignment factors which give rise to major concerns regarding competitive
distortions from a legal point of view. In our simple partial model the associated differing
transfers do not affect firms’ emission choice and overall economic efficiency. However, in a
more complex setting that incorporates income effects, economic distortions may also be
non-negligible.12
An efficient way out of the current regulation dilemma posed by the multiple objectives
of the EU Directive could be to relax the requirement of free allocation. Then, the minimal
fraction of allowances which must be allocated is given by the minimum of assignment
factors across EU Member States. As a mean to heading towards a more harmonized
allocation of allowances, a continuous increase of the auctioned ratio of tradable allowances
may prove a realistic policy option.
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Appendix A: CGE Model Summary
A.1. Non-technical model description
For determining the country-specific assignment factors r  as reported in Table 1 we make use of a
15-region, 9-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the EU economy calibrated to
empirical data. At the sectoral level the model incorporates sufficient details on differences in factor
intensities, degrees of factor substitutability and price elasticities of output demand in order to trace
back the structural change induced by carbon abatement policies. The sectors in the model have been
carefully selected to keep the most carbon-intensive sectors in the available data as separate as
possible. Table A.1 provides an overview of the sectors represented in the model.
Table A.1: Overview of model regions and sectors (commodities)
EU member countries Production sectors
Austria Primary energy carriers
Belgium COL Coal
Germany CRU Crude oil
Denmark GAS Natural gas
Spain Energy-intensive sectors (EIS)
Finland OIL Refined oil products
France ELE Electricity
United Kingdom ORE Iron and steel
Greece PPP Paper, pulp, and printing
Ireland NFM Non-ferrous metals
Italy Remaining manufacturers and services
Luxembourg ROI Rest of Industry
Netherlands
Portugal
Sweden
The energy goods identified in the model include primary carriers (coal, natural gas, crude oil)
and secondary energy carriers (refined oil products and electricity). Furthermore, the model features
three energy-intensive non-energy sectors (iron and steel; paper, pulp and printing; non-ferrous
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metals) whose installations – in addition to the secondary energy branches (refined oil products and
electricity) – are subject to the EU emissions trading Directive. The remaining manufacturers and
services are aggregated to a composite industry that produces a non-energy-intensive macro good.
Figure A.1 provides a diagrammatic overview of the model structure. Primary factors of each EU
region r include labor rL , capital rK , and fossil-fuel resources ,ff rQ . Labor and capital are assumed
to be mobile across sectors within each region. In fossil fuel production, part of capital is treated as a
sector-specific resource, resulting in upward sloping supply schedules consistent with exogenous own-
price elasticities of supply.
Production Yir of commodities i in region r, other than primary fossil fuels, is captured by
aggregate production functions which characterize technology through substitution possibilities
between various inputs. Nested, separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions with
three levels are employed to specify the substitution possibilities in domestic production between
capital, labor, energy and non-energy intermediate inputs, i.e. material. At the top level, material
inputs are employed in fixed proportions with an aggregate of energy, capital and labor. At the second
level, a CES function describes the substitution possibilities between the energy aggregate and the
aggregate of labor and capital. The value- added composite is a CES function of labor and capital. The
energy aggregate is produced with a CES function of a non-electric energy composite and electricity.
The non-electric energy composite in turn is a CES function of coal, crude oil, refined oil, and natural
gas. In the production of fossil fuels, all inputs, except for the sector-specific fossil fuel resource, are
aggregated in fixed proportions at the lower nest. At the top level, this aggregate trades off with the
sector-specific fossil fuel resource at a constant elasticity of substitution. The latter is calibrated in
consistency with exogenous price elasticities of fossil fuel supply.
Final consumption demand Cr in each region is determined by a representative agent RAr, who
maximizes consumption subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment. Aggregate consumption
of the representative agent is given as a CES composite which combines composite energy
consumption with a non-energy consumption bundle.
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Figure A.1: Diagrammatic model structure
 ,, ,r r ff rL K Q
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VSubstitution patterns within the non-energy consumption bundle are reflected via Cobb-
Douglas functions. The energy aggregate in final demand consists of the various energy
goods trading off at a constant elasticity of substitution. Government demand within each
region is fixed at exogenous real levels. Public goods and services are produced with a CES
aggregation of commodity inputs. The expenditure for public good provision is handled
through the budget constraint of the representative agent.
Trade between regions is specified using the Armington approach of product
heterogeneity, so domestic and foreign goods of the same variety are distinguished by origin.
The Armington composite Air for a traded good is a CES function of an imported composite
Mir and domestic production for that sector. The import composite is then a CES function of
an EU import composite and imports from the rest of the world (ROW). The EU import
composite of a specific EU region in turn is a CES function of production from all other EU
countries. EU countries are assumed to be price-takers with respect to world market prices,
i.e. ROW import-supply functions and ROW export-demand functions are perfectly elastic.
There is an imposed balance of payment constraint to ensure trade balance between the EU
and ROW through a flexible exchange rate. That is, the value of imports from the ROW to
the EU must equal the value of exports from the EU to the ROW after accounting for the
benchmark trade deficit or surplus of EU regions.
The effects of exogenous policy changes are measured with respect to a reference
situation. In our comparative-static analysis, the reference situation is captured by economic
transactions in a particular benchmark year (here: 1997). As is customary in applied general
equilibrium analysis, benchmark quantities and prices – together with exogenous elasticities
(see Table A.7 below) – determine the parameters of functional forms. For this model
calibration, we employ the GTAP-5E database (McDougall 1999)13 which provides most
recent consistent accounts of regional production and consumption, bilateral trade and energy
flows for up to 66 countries and 23 commodities.
                                                          
13 McDougall, R.A. (1999), ed., Global Trade, Assistance and Protection: The GTAP 5 Data  Base,
Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University, West Lafayette.
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A.2 Algebraic model description
The model is formulated as a system of nonlinear inequalities. These inequalities correspond
to two classes of equilibrium conditions: zero profit and market clearance. The fundamental
unknowns of the system are two vectors: activity levels and prices. In equilibrium, each of
these variables is linked to one inequality condition: an activity level to a zero-profit
condition and a commodity (factor) price to a market-clearance condition.
In the algebraic exposition below, the notation zir  is used to denote the (zero-)profit
function of sector j in region r where z is the name assigned to the associated production
activity. Differentiating the profit function with respect to input and output prices provides
compensated demand and supply coefficients (Hotellings’s lemma), which appear
subsequently in the market clearance conditions. We use i (aliased with j) as an index for
commodities (sectors) and r (aliased with s) as an index for regions. The label EG represents
the set of energy goods and the label FF denotes the subset of fossil fuels. Tables A.2 - A.7
explain the notations for variables and parameters employed within our algebraic exposition.
Figures A.2 - A.6 provide a graphical exposition of the production and final consumption
structure.
The implementation of cost-efficient National Allocation Plans across EU member states
is equivalent to a comprehensive carbon trade equilibrium: Marginal abatement costs are
equalized across all sectors and EU regions (to be achieved by domestic carbon taxes for non-
trading sectors where the tax rate is set at the level of the international permit price for trading
sectors). With lump-sum allocation of emission allowances to the trading sectors under the
Directive and a representative agent per EU region, the revenues from carbon regulation –
either in terms of tax revenues or the implicit value of free allowances – enter the budget
constraint of the representative agent.
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Zero Profit Conditions
1. Production of goods except fossil fuels:
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where irY  ( i ff ) is the associated activity variable.
2. Production of fossil fuels:
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where irY ( i ff ) is the associated activity variable.
3. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
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 where irE  is the associated activity variable.
4. Armington aggregate:
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where irA  is the associated activity variable.
5. Aggregate imports across import regions:
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where irM  is the associated activity variable.
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6. Household consumption aggregate:
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where rC  is the associated activity variable.
7. Household energy aggregate:
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where CrE  is the associated activity variable.
8. Investment:
0I I AIir irrr
i
 =  -  pp  
where rI  is the associated activity variable.
Market Clearance Conditions
9. Labor:
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where rw  is the associated price variable.
10. Capital:
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where r  is the associated price variable.
11. Natural resources:
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where irq  is the associated price variable.
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12. Output for internal markets:
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where irp  is the associated price variable.
13. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
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where Eirp  is the associated price variable.
14. Import aggregate:
A
ir
ir ir M
ir
    M A  p
 


where Mirp  is the associated price variable.
15. Armington aggregate:
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where Airp  is the associated price variable.
16. Investment aggregate:
r rI   I
where Irp  is the associated price variable.
17. Household consumption:
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where Crp  is the associated price variable.
X18. Aggregate household energy consumption:
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where ECrp  is the associated price variable.
19. Carbon emissions:
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where 2COrp  is the associated price variable.
20. Balance of payments:
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where Wp  is the associated price variable.
Table A.2: Sets
I Sectors and goods
J Aliased with i
R Regions
S Aliased with r
EG All energy goods: Coal, crude oil, refined oil, gas and electricity
FF Primary fossil fuels: Coal, crude oil and gas
LQ Liquid fuels: Crude oil and gas
Table A.3: Activity variables
irY Production in sector i and region r
irE Aggregate energy input in sector i and region r
irM Aggregate imports of good i and region r
irA Armington aggregate of good i in region r
rC Aggregate household consumption in region r
CrE Aggregate household energy consumption in region r
rI Aggregate investment in region r
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Table A.4: Price variables
pir Output price of good i produced in region r for domestic market
Wp Real exchange rate with the rest of the world (ROW)
pEir Price of aggregate energy in sector i and region r
pMir Import price aggregate for good i imported to region r
A
irp Price of Armington good i in region r
pCr Price of aggregate household consumption in region r
pECr Price of aggregate household energy consumption in region r
I
rp Price of aggregate investment good in region r
rw Wage rate in region r
rv Price of capital services in region r
irq Rent to natural resources in region r (i  FF)
2CO
rp Shadow price of CO2 unit in region r
Table A.5: Cost shares
XROW
ir
Share of ROW exports in sector i and region r
jir Share of intermediate good j in sector i and region r (iFF)
KLE
ir
Share of KLE aggregate in sector i and region r (iFF)
E
ir
Share of energy in the KLE aggregate of sector i and region r (iFF)
T
ir
Share of labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and region r (iFF)
Q
ir
Share of natural resources in sector i of region r (iFF)
FF
Tir
Share of good i (T=i) or labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and
region r (iFF)

COA
ir Share of coal in fossil fuel demand by sector i in region r (iFF)

ELE
ir
Share of electricity in energy demand by sector i in region r
jir Share of liquid fossil fuel j in energy demand by sector i in region r
(iFF, jLQ)

M
isr
Share of imports of good i from region s to region r
MROW
ir Share of ROW imports of good i in region r

A
ir
Share of domestic variety in Armington good i of region r
XII

E
Cr
Share of fossil fuel composite in aggregate household consumption in
region r
I
ir
Share of good i in investment composite in region r
ir Share of non-energy good i in non-energy household consumption
demand in region r

E
iCr
Share of fossil fuel i in household energy consumption in region r
Table A.6: Endowments and emissions coefficients
Lr Aggregate labor endowment for region r
rK Aggregate capital endowment for region r
irQ Endowment of natural resource i for region r (iFF)
Br Balance of payment deficit or surplus in region r (note: 0
r
rB )
2CO r Endowment of carbon emission rights in region r
2CO
ia Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i (iFF)
Table A.7: Elasticities
 Transformation between production for the domestic market
and production for the export
4
KLE
Substitution between energy and value-added in production
(except fossil fuels)
0.5
iQ, Substitution between natural resources and other inputs in
fossil fuel production calibrated consistently to exogenous
supply elasticities FF .
COA=0.5
CRU=0.5
GAS =1.0
ELE
Substitution between electricity and the fossil fuel aggregate in
production
0.3
COA
Substitution between coal and the liquid fossil fuel composite
in production
0.5
A
Substitution between the import aggregate and the domestic
input
2
M
Substitution between imports from different regions 4
EC
Substitution between the fossil fuel composite and the non-
fossil fuel consumption aggregate in household consumption
0.8
CFF ,
Substitution between fossil fuels in household fossil energy
consumption
0.3
For the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix B the lower and upper values of the uniform
probability distributions for six key elasticities are as follows:
1 < A < 4; 2 < M < 8; 0.25 < KLE < 0.75; 0.6 < EC  < 1; 0.25 < CRU  < 1; 0.25 < COL  < 1.
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Figure A.2: Nesting in non-fossil fuel production
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Figure A.3: Nesting in fossil fuel production
CES
Leontief
CETInternal market variety ROW export market variety
Fuel specific resource
Intermediate inputs Labor Capital
Non-fuel specific resource inputs
Figure A.4: Nesting in household consumption
CES
CES
Non energy goods & Electricity
(Cobb-Douglas composite)
Oil Gas Coal
Fossil fuel composite
Consumption
XIV
Figure A.5: Nesting in Armington production
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Figure A.6: Nesting in import aggregate
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Appendix B:  Sensitivity Analysis
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of our core simulation results with respect to uncertainties
in the elasticity space we have conducted 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. In each simulation,
values for six elasticities (trade elasticities, energy demand elasticities and fossil fuel supply
elasticities) that are key determinants for the economic adjustment associated with carbon
emission constraints are drawn from uniform probability distributions around the model
central values (see Table A.7 in Appendix A).
Table B.1 provides a statistical summary of results for the cost-efficient emission
allocation to the non-trading sectors (and, thus, also to the trading sectors), the assignment
factors as well as the share of tradable allowances that must be auctioned within each region
in order to preserve competition neutrality. It is obvious that all of our central case CGE
estimates remain very robust even when accounting for substantial uncertainty in the
parameterization space.
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Table B.1: Sensitivity analysis
core value
5% 
quantile median mean
95% 
quantile
standard 
deviation
Cost-efficient CO 2  emissions e * NTR [Mt]
Austria 36 36 36 36 36 0.00
Belgium 95 95 95 95 96 0.45
Germany 484 481 483 483 486 1.68
Denmark 32 32 32 32 32 0.16
Spain 27 168 169 169 171 1.04
Finland 313 27 27 27 27 0.00
France 328 312 313 313 315 1.02
United Kingdom 46 327 328 328 329 0.60
Greece 17 46 46 46 47 0.48
Ireland 257 17 17 17 18 0.49
Italy 6 256 257 257 258 0.60
Luxembourg 153 6 6 6 6 0.00
Netherlands 35 152 153 153 153 0.39
Portugal 169 34 35 35 35 0.36
Sweden 45 44 45 45 45 0.50
EU-15 2043 2033 2042 2043 2054 1.50
Assignment factor  r
Austria 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.00
Belgium 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.01
Germany 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.00
Denmark 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.00
Spain 0.81 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.01
Finland 1.13 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.00
France 0.90 1.10 1.13 1.13 1.15 0.02
United Kingdom 1.21 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.00
Greece 0.88 1.19 1.21 1.20 1.21 0.01
Ireland 0.81 0.81 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.04
Italy 0.96 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.00
Luxembourg 0.57 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.00
Netherlands 1.24 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.01
Portugal 0.94 1.24 1.24 1.25 1.30 0.02
Sweden 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.10 0.05
EU-15 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.01
Minimum assignment factor min
0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.00
Auction [% of tradable permits]
Austria 17 17 17 17 17 1.11
Belgium 19 13 19 17 19 2.81
Germany 58 57 58 58 58 0.62
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
Spain 58 63 64 64 64 0.62
Finland 70 58 58 58 58 0.48
France 62 69 70 70 70 0.56
United Kingdom 72 62 62 62 63 0.58
Greece 61 71 72 72 72 0.54
Ireland 58 58 61 60 61 1.48
Italy 64 58 58 58 58 0.48
Luxembourg 40 64 64 64 64 0.48
Netherlands 73 38 40 40 42 0.93
Portugal 64 73 73 73 74 0.37
Sweden 66 66 66 67 69 1.47
EU-15 59 58 59 59 59 0.62
